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INTRODUCTION
Unlike most cases brought before the United States Supreme Court,
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission1 captured
the nation’s attention. In this case, free speech rights were pitted against
an anti-discrimination law, and religious rights were pitted against the
dignity of same-sex marriage. While these constitutional doctrines might
seem nuanced and obscure to most, the central issue of the case is easy to
grasp: Can a baker, on free speech and free exercise grounds, refuse to
bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple?2 The Court, in a 7–2

2016.

* J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law 2019; B.S., University of Florida
1. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
2. Id. at 1723.
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decision,3 ruled solely on the free exercise claim, which, at the time, came
as a surprise to most.4
This Comment serves a few purposes: It explains the facts of the case
and the Justices’ arguments, summarizes the relevant constitutional
doctrines, and provides some novel thoughts on the decision reached.
I. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins planned to marry in
Massachusetts.5 Even though their home state of Colorado did not
recognize same-sex marriage, they intended to celebrate their marriage
with family and friends there.6 To procure a celebratory wedding cake,
the couple visited Masterpiece Cakeshop, a Colorado bakery owned by
Jack Phillips, a devout Christian.7 Craig, Mullins, and Phillips’s
interaction at Masterpiece lasted mere moments.8 The couple told Phillips
that they intended to buy a wedding cake for “our wedding,” and Phillips
told the couple that he “does not ‘create’ wedding cakes for same-sex
weddings.”9 Phillips based this decision on his religious beliefs.10 Neither
party discussed design or other aesthetic characteristics of the cake.11
Phillips offered the couple “birthday cakes, shower cakes, . . . cookies[,]
and brownies” but would not create a wedding cake.12 The couple left the
3. Id. at 1722.
4. Id. at 1724. One commentator said that the Court “confounded all expectations.”
Michael W. McConnell, Justices Confound Expectation in Colorado Wedding Cake Case, SLS
(June 4, 2018), https://law.stanford.edu/2018/06/04/justices-confound-expectation-in-coloradowedding-cake-case/ [https://perma.cc/SFH4-8TC7].
For what it is worth, Jack Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, is back in court with
another discrimination-based lawsuit. Colleen Slevin, Colorado Baker Back in Court over 2nd
LGBT Bias Allegation, AP (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/1a242f6d02d54cc68963
a18e9ee3ede5 [https://perma.cc/HBA7-LTPU].
5. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
6. Id. Three years later, the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015), constitutionalized the right to same-sex marriage. Id. at 2604 (“[T]he right to marry is a
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived
of that right and that liberty.”).
7. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas
provided a more detailed description of Phillips’s artistic practices and religious beliefs. Id. at
1742–43 (Thomas, J., concurring).
8. See Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig & David Mullins at 4, Masterpiece Cakeshop,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
9. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
10. Id. (“To Phillips, creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding would be equivalent
to participating in a celebration that is contrary to his own deeply held beliefs.”).
11. See id.
12. Id.
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bakery, and the following day, Craig’s mother telephoned the bakery.13
When Craig’s mother asked why Phillips would not bake the wedding
cake for her son, Phillips again explained his religious objections.14
In September 2012, Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination claim
with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission.15 The couple alleged that
Phillips violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, which prohibits
places of public accommodation from discriminating based on sexual
orientation.16 Phillips argued that Colorado’s enforcement of the antidiscrimination law violated his constitutional rights to free speech and
free exercise of religion.17
The case snaked its way through the state administrative agency,18
where each decision-making body ruled against Phillips.19 Eventually,
the case came before the full commission.20 The commission concluded
that Phillips discriminated against Craig and Mullins based on their
sexual orientation and ordered Phillips to comply with remedial
measures.21
13. Id.
14. Id. Justice Gorsuch, in his concurring opinion, used the fact that Phillips denied the
mother’s request to bake the cake to argue that Phillips—regardless of the sexual orientation of
the customer—would not bake a cake for a same-sex wedding. Id. at 1735 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). Therefore, according to the Justice, Phillips did not discriminate based on sexual
orientation. Id. at 1735–36.
15. Id. at 1725 (majority opinion).
16. See id. Specifically, the act states the following:
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to
refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of disability,
race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, or
ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation
....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2018).
17. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726.
18. The Court described how a case makes its way through the state agency. After a
complaint is filed, the Colorado Civil Rights Division investigates the claim and determines
whether the state anti-discrimination law was violated. Id. at 1725. If the division so decides, the
case goes before the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, where the commission determines
whether to “initiate a formal hearing before” an administrative law judge. Id. If the commission
so decides, the administrative law judge hears the case and issues a ruling. Id. That ruling may
then be appealed to the commission. Id.
19. Id. at 1726.
20. Id.
21. Id. (“The Commission ordered Phillips to ‘cease and desist from discriminating against
. . . same-sex couples . . . .’ It also ordered additional remedial measures, including
‘comprehensive staff training on the Public Accommodations section’ of [the anti-discrimination
law] ‘and changes to any and all company policies[,]’ . . . [and required] Phillips to prepare
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Throughout the adjudication, many commissioners commented on
Phillips’s religious basis for denying service to Craig and Mullins. One
commissioner noted that Phillips needed to “compromise” his religious
beliefs to conduct business in the state.22 Another commented that
religious freedom “has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination
throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust—I
mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations . . . . [I]t is one of the most
despicable pieces of rhetoric . . . .”23
Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the commission’s decision.24 The court determined that Phillips’s free
speech rights were not violated because baking is not expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment and that the commission’s order did
not compel Phillips to convey a supportive message of same-sex
marriage.25 The court also determined that Phillips’s free exercise rights
were not violated because the anti-discrimination law is a law of general
application that the commission applied neutrally.26 The Colorado
Supreme Court denied review, but the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in 2017.27
Around the same time of Phillips’s adjudication, the commission
handled a somewhat similar case. William Jack, a devout Christian,
sought to purchase a custom-made cake with anti-gay designs.28 Three
Colorado bakeries denied Jack’s requests, and Jack filed a complaint with
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission.29 The commission determined
that the bakeries properly denied Jack’s requests since their denials were
based not on Jack’s religion but on the cake designs’ anti-gay messages,
which the commission deemed offensive.30

‘quarterly compliance reports’ . . . and . . . ‘describ[e] the remedial actions taken.’” (first alteration
in original) (citations omitted)).
22. See id. at 1729.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1726–27.
25. Id. at 1727.
26. Id. Justice Kennedy noted that the court of appeals did not mention the commission’s
religion-related comments and that it instead, only in a footnote, compared the commission’s
handling of William Jack’s and Phillips’s cases. Id. at 1730.
27. Id. at 1727.
28. Id. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, provided more
information about Jack’s cake designs. Id. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1728–29 (majority opinion).
30. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol71/iss5/6

4

Beato: Let Them Eat Cake or Let Him Not Bake? Summary and Analysis of Ma

2019]

LET THEM EAT CAKE OR LET THEM NOT BAKE?

1351

II. THE FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINE
The First Amendment prescribes that “Congress shall make no
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.31 Even with this broad
constitutional protection, under certain circumstances the government
can compel or punish conduct that an individual’s religion prohibits.32
For example, the government can compel a food vendor to sell food to
African Americans, despite the vendor’s religious objections.33 As
established in Employment Division v. Smith,34 the government can
compel or punish conduct, despite religious objections, if the government
neutrally enforces a generally applicable law.35 For example, the
government can enforce a generally applicable anti-drug-consumption
law to prevent the ritual consumption of a psychedelic drug.36
Under the Smith framework, neutral administration and enactment of
law is a key aspect of the analysis.37 The government must treat each
religious individual or group with respect and tolerance.38 Even “subtle
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (“At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if
the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct
because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”).
Academics dispute the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause. Some academics
believe that the clause exempts religious objectors from neutral laws of general applicability. See,
e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1990) (“The conclusions of this analysis are (1) that
exemptions were seen as a constitutionally permissible means for protecting religious freedom,
(2) that constitutionally compelled exemptions were within the contemplation of the framers and
ratifiers as a possible interpretation of the free exercise clause, and (3) that exemptions were
consonant with the popular American understanding of the interrelation between the claims of a
limited government and a sovereign God.”). Others believe that such exemptions were not
originally understood. See, e.g., Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1085
(2008) (concluding, after analyzing the drafting of the Second Amendment, that such exemptions
were not originally understood).
32. E.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402–03 n.5 (1968).
33. Id. at 400, 402 n.5.
34. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
35. Id. at 886 n.3.
36. See id. at 890.
37. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993)
(“In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated the principle that the First Amendment
forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general.”). See
also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 396–97 (1990)
(“From the State’s point of view, the critical question is not whether the materials are religious,
but whether there is a sale or a use, a question which only involves a secular determination.”).
38. See id. at 540; see also id. at 547 (“The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself
to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem
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departures from neutrality” evidence a lack of respect for and tolerance
of religion, which violates the First Amendment.39 This determination is
based on “the historical background of the decision under challenge, the
specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in
question, and the legislative or administrative history, including
contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking
body.”40 Additionally, the government cannot engage in “religious
gerrymander[ing],” where the government creates rules or schemes that
target or affect only religious individuals or entities.41
To illustrate, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,42 the Hialeah City Council passed an ordinance that prohibited
animal sacrifice, a known ritual of the Santeria religion.43 During
deliberations, city council members commented on the Santeria religion.
One councilman questioned, “[I]f we could not practice this [religion] in
our homeland [of Cuba], why bring it to this country?”44 Another stated
that members of the Santeria religion “are in violation of everything this
country stands for.”45 Another stated that he was “totally against the
sacrificing of animals” because although the “Bible says we are allowed
to sacrifice an animal for consumption[;] . . . for any other purposes, I
don’t believe that the Bible allows that.”46
The Court determined that the city council enacted this ordinance to
specifically target members of the Santeria religion.47 Using the Smith
framework, the Court held that the ordinance was not a neutral law of
general applicability.48 Speaking to neutrality, the Court determined that
the ordinance was passed to suppress religion.49 The Court held:

from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their
own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.”).
39. Id. at 534 (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).
40. Id. at 540. In other words, courts must look to “direct and circumstantial evidence.” Id.
41. See id. at 535 (defining “religious gerrymander” as “an impermissible attempt to target
petitioners and their religious practices” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring))); see also Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free
Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850,
863–67 (2001) (analyzing the religious gerrymander in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye).
42. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
43. Id. at 527, 530.
44. Id. at 541 (alterations in original).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 545 (“We conclude, in sum, that each of Hialeah’s ordinances pursues the city’s
governmental interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief.”).
48. Id. at 545–46.
49. Id.
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The pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria
adherents and their religious practices; the ordinances by
their own terms target this religious exercise; the texts of the
ordinances were gerrymandered with care to proscribe
religious killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular
killings; and the ordinances suppress much more religious
conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate
ends asserted in their defense. These ordinances are not
neutral, and the court below committed clear error in failing
to reach this conclusion.50
Thus, according to the Court, the city council violated the religious
rights of the members of the Santeria religion.51
III. THE MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP OPINIONS
In a 7–2 decision, the United States Supreme Court, led by Justice
Anthony Kennedy, ruled that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
violated Phillips’s free exercise rights.52 Justice Kagan, joined by Justice
Breyer, wrote a concurring opinion that stressed the narrowness of the
majority’s opinion, and further argued that the commission could
rightfully treat Jack’s and Phillips’s cases differently, and disagreed with
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence.53 Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito,
concurred but elaborated on Phillips’s free exercise claims in light of
Justice Kagan’s concurrence and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.54 Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred but wrote separately to
rebut the Colorado Court of Appeals’s free speech arguments.55 Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented and argued that the
commission properly enforced the state anti-discrimination law.56

50. Id. at 542 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 547. The Court also analyzed the general applicability of the ordinance. Id. at
542–46.
52. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018).
53. Id. at 1732–34 (Kagan, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 1734–40 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 1740–48 (Thomas, J., concurring). Here is Justice Thomas’s argument: For
conduct to be expressive, thus warranting First Amendment free speech protections, (1) the actor
must subjectively intend to convey a message through conduct and (2) the audience must
objectively understand the communicative nature of the conduct. Id. at 1741. Justice Thomas
argued that Phillips, by baking wedding cakes, subjectively believed that a wedding cake
“communicates that ‘a wedding has occurred, a marriage has begun, and the couple should be
celebrated.’” Id. at 1743. The audience understands that “[w]edding cakes do, in fact,
communicate this message.” Id. (analyzing the history of wedding cakes). Therefore, Justice
Thomas would have ruled differently than the court of appeals.
56. Id. at 1748–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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IV. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Surprisingly, the Court decided the case on free exercise, not free
speech, grounds.57 Using the Free Exercise Clause’s doctrinal
framework, Justice Kennedy analyzed whether the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission neutrally enforced a generally applicable law.58 He
determined that it did not.59 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy
focused on the commissioners’ statements regarding religion that were
made during Phillips’s adjudication as well as the commission’s disparate
treatment of Jack’s and Phillips’s cases.60
Justice Kennedy described the commission’s statements as “clear[ly]
and impermissibl[y] hostil[e] toward” Phillips’s religious beliefs.61 For
example, one commissioner stated that Phillips should compromise his
religious beliefs to conduct business in the state.62 Another commissioner
attributed atrocities such as slavery and the Holocaust to religion, calling
religion “despicable” rhetoric when it is used to justify discrimination.63
Though Justice Kennedy ultimately determined that the former statement
was open to different interpretations,64 he described the latter statement
as clear evidence of the commission’s nonneutrality and hostility toward
Phillips’s religious beliefs.65
Justice Kennedy also analyzed the commission’s treatment of William
Jack, the Christian consumer who sought cakes with anti-gay messages.66
The commission deemed Jack’s cake designs offensive but praised the
bakeries’ willingness to bake religiously themed cakes without the antigay messages.67 The commission determined that the bakeries properly
57. Justice Kennedy briefly touched on the free speech issues. He sympathized with the
“artistic” Phillips’s free speech beliefs, finding “it difficult to find a line where the customers’
rights to goods and services became a demand for [Phillips] to exercise the right of his own
personal expression for [Craig and Mullins’s] message, a message he could not express in a way
consistent with his religious beliefs.” Id. at 1728 (majority opinion). But he noted that this issue
“must await further elaboration in the courts.” Id. at 1732.
58. Id. at 1731–32.
59. Id. at 1732.
60. Id. at 1729–31.
61. Id. at 1729.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. “On the one hand,” the statements could mean that businesses cannot discriminate based
on sexual orientation “regardless of the proprietor’s personal views.” Id. “On the other hand,” the
statements could be dismissive comments about Phillips’s religious beliefs. Id. “[T]he latter seems
more likely.” Id.
65. Id. (“This sentiment is inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn
responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s antidiscrimination law—a law
protects against discrimination on the basis of religion as well as orientation.”).
66. Id. at 1730–31.
67. Id.
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denied Jack’s requests because their “conscience-based objections [were]
legitimate.”68 With Phillips, Justice Kennedy noted that the commission
seemingly approved of Craig and Mullins’s wedding cake message but
did not consider Phillips’s willingness to bake other cakes, cookies, and
brownies for the couple as it did in the case of Jack.69 The commission
determined that Phillips improperly denied Craig and Mullins’s request
because his conscience-based concerns were illegitimate.70 Justice
Kennedy concluded that, in doing so, the commission protected beliefs
that it agreed with and impermissibly punished beliefs that it disagreed
with.71
Because the commission expressed anti-religious sentiments during
Phillips’s case, and because the commission unequally applied the antidiscrimination law between Jack’s and Phillips’s cases, the majority held
that the commission did not act in a neutral manner, which violated
Phillips’s free exercise rights.72
V. THE KAGAN CONCURRENCE
Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred with the majority
opinion.73 Justice Kagan agreed that the commission did not act neutrally
during Phillips’s adjudication,74 but asserted that Jack’s and Phillips’s
cases were distinguishable.75 Justice Kagan argued that the bakeries in
Jack’s case acted properly because they “did not single out Jack because
of his religion.”76 The bakeries denied Jack’s cake requests because they
disagreed with the cake designs’ anti-gay message—a message the
bakeries would not have conveyed, regardless of customer.77 Justice
Kagan contended that Phillips, in contrast, singled out Craig and Mullins
because of their sexual orientation.78 While Phillips may have disagreed
with same-sex marriage and the message that baking a wedding cake for
a same-sex marriage could have conveyed, he would have baked the cake
had the couple been opposite-sex.79 Therefore, Phillips denied the couple
68. Id. at 1730.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 1731 (“A principled rationale for the difference in treatment of these two instances
cannot be based on the government’s own assessment of offensiveness.”).
72. Id. at 1732.
73. Id. (Kagan, J., concurring).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1732–33 (describing the differences as “obvious”).
76. Id. at 1733.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Justice Gorsuch disagreed. See id. at 1736 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“In both cases,
it was the kind of cake, not the kind of customer, that mattered to the bakers.”). Justice Kagan
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his service because of their sexual orientation and not the message that
the wedding cake would have conveyed.80 In Justice Kagan’s opinion,
this constituted unlawful discrimination under the state’s antidiscrimination law.81
VI. THE GORSUCH CONCURRENCE
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, agreed with the majority’s
central arguments: The commission acted biasedly against Phillips’s
religion, and the commission treated Jack’s and Phillips’s cases
disparately, all amounting to a violation of Phillips’s free exercise
rights.82 The concurrence purported to take aim at Justice Kagan’s
concurrence and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.83
Generally, the more liberal Justices agreed that Jack’s and Phillips’s
cases were distinguishable. Justice Kagan admitted that the commission
could have, but failed to, articulate a proper reason for this different
treatment,84 while Justice Ginsburg wholly denied that the commission
acted impermissibly at all.85
Justice Gorsuch highlighted that, in Jack’s and Phillips’s cases, the
decisions were based on the “kind of cake, not the kind of customer.”86
In Jack’s case, it was a cake with anti-gay messages.87 For Phillips, it was
a cake that endorsed same-sex marriage.88 In Jack’s case, the bakeries
would have not have baked a cake with the anti-gay messages, regardless
of the protected classification of the prospective customer.89 For Phillips,
he would not have baked a cake for a same-sex wedding, regardless of
the protected classification of the prospective customers.90 While the
bakeries in the two cases knew that they were denying service to
customers with a protected classification, the bakeries did not
intentionally deny service because of the customers’ protected

reinforced her arguments in a footnote that was directed to Justice Gorsuch. Id. at 1733 n.*
(Kagan, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 1733–34.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 1751 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I see no reason why the comments of one or two
Commissioners should be taken to overcome Phillips’[s] refusal to sell a wedding cake to Craig
and Mullins.”).
86. Id. at 1736 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 1735.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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classifications.91 The distinction between knowingly denying service and
intentionally denying service was a material aspect of Justice Gorsuch’s
argument.92
Justice Gorsuch then commented on the commission’s disparate
treatment of Jack and Phillips, particularly in applying different legal
standards to the two cases.93 In Jack’s case, the commission noted the
difference between intentionally and knowingly denying service to a
customer.94 Because the bakeries knowingly denied service to Jack but
did not intentionally do so because of his protected classification, the
commission held that the bakeries acted permissibly.95 But in Phillips’s
case, the commission held that denying service to a customer with a
protected classification created a presumption of intentional
discrimination.96 Though Phillips knowingly denied service to Craig and
Mullins but did not intentionally do so because of their classification,
Phillips presumably discriminated based on a protected classification.97
Justice Gorsuch noted that the commission was trying to “have it both
ways.”98 “Either actual proof of intent to discriminate . . . is required . . . or
it is sufficient to ‘presume’ such intent” from knowingly denying service
to someone in a protected classification.99 Such “slid[ing] up and down
the mens rea scale,” Justice Gorsuch concluded, would not do.100
VII. THE GINSBURG DISSENT
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, argued that Jack’s and
Phillips’s cases were distinguishable and the comments made by the
commission did not violate Phillips’s free exercise rights.101 Justice
Ginsburg parroted the arguments made in Justice Kagan’s concurrence:
The three bakeries in Jack’s case properly denied his anti-gay cake
requests because the bakeries disagreed with his message—a message
they would not convey, regardless of the protected classification of the
prospective customer—while Phillips improperly denied Craig and
Mullins’s request because of their sexual orientation.102
Justice Ginsburg noted that Phillips’s offer to sell other baked goods
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1735–36.
Id.
Id. at 1736.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1737.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1748–49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1750.
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to Craig and Mullins was “irrelevant” because Phillips makes wedding
cakes for opposite-sex couples but not same-sex couples.103 The three
bakeries’ offering to sell Jack a cake with religious symbolism other than
an anti-gay-marriage message was relevant because the bakeries offer
religious cakes to Christian and non-Christian consumers alike.104
Justice Ginsburg also understated the commissioners’ anti-religious
statements. The Justice saw “no reason why the comments of one or two
Commissioners should be taken to overcome Phillips’[s] refusal to sell a
wedding cake to Craig and Mullins.”105 She noted that Phillips’s case
snaked through the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and was also
evaluated by the Colorado Court of Appeals after the commission’s
decision.106 Each decision-making body ruled against Phillips.107 She
faulted the majority for not identifying where prejudice manifested itself
in the decision-making process.108 She also differentiated between the
case at issue and the Court’s free exercise precedent.109 Taken in total,
Justice Ginsburg would have ruled in favor of Craig and Mullins.110
VIII. ANALYSIS
To begin broadly, the Supreme Court, somewhat startlingly, ruled
solely on the free exercise arguments, as opposed to the free speech
arguments.111 Perhaps there is some virtue to this decision. For one, the
free speech arguments are definitely the less clear-cut of the two
arguments,112 and the commission clearly violated Phillips’s free exercise
rights by acting in a nonneutral manner. Granted, the case was teed up as
a free speech case—even the Solicitor General’s brief only addressed the
free speech arguments.113 The free exercise ruling leaves one a bit
wanting. But still, this case was—and is—controversial. Thus, by solely
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1751.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1751–52.
110. Id. at 1752.
111. Id. at 1732 (majority opinion).
112. Even Justice Kennedy admitted this. He sympathized with the “artistic” Phillips’s free
speech beliefs, finding it “difficult to find a line where the customers’ rights to goods and services
became a demand for [Phillips] to exercise the right of his own personal expression for [Craig and
Mullins’s] message, a message he could not express in a way consistent with his religious beliefs.”
Id. at 1728.
113. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at III, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (arguing, solely, that the “First Amendment’s Free
Speech Clause bars the application of Colorado’s public accommodations law to petitioners in
this case”).
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addressing the less controversial constitutional issue, the Court avoided a
sharper public reaction and afforded more time for the free speech issues
to percolate.
Turning to the free exercise arguments, the Court determined that the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not enforce the state’s antidiscrimination law neutrally, and this lack of neutrality was evidenced by
the commission’s statements on religion and the commission’s disparate
treatment of the Jack and Phillips cases.114
This analysis stayed true to the Court’s precedent. The Court stayed
within its Smith free exercise framework and provided another example
where the government applied a law nonneutrally. Specifically, the Court
looked to “the historical background of the decision under challenge, the
specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in
question, and the legislative or administrative history, including
contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking
body.”115 In this case, the Court looked to the “specific series of events”
of the commission’s adjudication of Jack’s and Phillips’s cases.116 It
looked to the “contemporaneous statements made by members” of the
commission.117 The Court then determined that the commission engaged
in a religious gerrymander, where the government applied different rules
and standards to religious and non-religious actors.118 Taken in total, the
Court determined that the commission did not act neutrally and thus
violated Phillips’s free exercise rights.119
While seven of the nine Justices agreed with this result,120 Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor did not. The dissent instead argued that the
commissioners’ statements regarding Phillips’s religion were irrelevant,
that anti-religious prejudice could not be found in the decision-making
process, and that the majority did not adhere to its free exercise
precedent.121 In doing so, the dissent risks complicating the Free Exercise
Clause analysis by adding exceptions and qualifications to the doctrine.
Ultimately, the dissent’s arguments missed the mark, and each argument
is next discussed in turn.
114. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
115. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 532, 540 (1993). In
other words, courts must look to “direct and circumstantial evidence.” Id.
116. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–30, 1731.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1732; id. at 1739 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 1731 (majority opinion) (“For the reasons just described, the Commission’s
treatment of Phillips’[s] case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws
or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint.”).
120. Id. at 1722. Granted, Justices Breyer and Kagan believed that the Jack and Phillips cases
were distinguishable from one another. Id. at 1732–33 (Kagan, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 1751–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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First, the dissent simply tossed the commission’s comments on
religion aside. The dissent saw “no reason why the comments of one or
two Commissioners should be taken to overcome Phillips’[s] refusal to
sell a wedding cake to Craig and Mullins.”122 However, when analyzing
free exercise claims, courts must look to “contemporaneous statements
made by members of the decisionmaking body.”123 And the statements
made by some commissioners were plainly biased against Phillips’s
religion. One commissioner commented that religious beliefs should be
compromised to conduct business in Colorado.124 Another attributed
mass atrocities to religion.125 Like the comments made by the Hialeah
City Council in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,126 these statements
evidenced a bias against religion. These statements showed intolerance
for Phillips’s religion, and tolerance, according to the Court, is crucial to
an individual’s free exercise rights.127
True, only a few commissioners made these statements. But as the
dissent noted,128 even if “one or two” commissioners made these
statements, as opposed to four or five, these statements, at best, evidence
that “one or two” commissioners did not neutrally enforce the antidiscrimination law. At worst, they evidence that anti-religious sentiment
festered in the commission’s adjudication. Either way, a governmental
body and governmental actors showed intolerance for an individual’s
religion.129 The Court majority suggests that every governmental actor,
at every step of the adjudicatory process, must show tolerance and respect
for religion. This ensures governmental respect and toleration of religious
values and, in turn, protects religious liberty.
The dissent focused too heavily on the actions of the lower levels of
the commission and the appellate review of the court of appeals. True,
the record does not evidence that these decision-making bodies showed
122. Id. at 1750.
123. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 532, 540 (1993).
124. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
125. Id.
126. 508 U.S. at 541.
127. Id. at 532 (“Indeed, it was ‘historical instances of religious persecution and intolerance
that gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause.’” (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693, 703 (1986))).
128. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1751 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
129. See generally Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975) (“[A] ‘fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’ . . . Not only is a biased decisionmaker
constitutionally unacceptable but ‘our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness.’ In pursuit of this end, various situations have been identified in which
experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is
too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” (citation omitted) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955))).
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bias or animosity toward Phillips.130 But the commission did. The
commission was intolerant of Phillips’s beliefs, regardless of the court of
appeals’s or the lower levels of the commission’s actions. The
commission itself caused harm to Phillips’s religious rights, and as such,
the inquiry should center on the commission. Appellate courts and lower
adjudicatory bodies cannot and should not wash away constitutional
violations of governmental bodies.
This intolerance and nonneutrality are evidenced not only by the
commission’s contemporaneous statements but also by the specific series
of events in its adjudication of Jack’s and Phillips’s cases. Justice
Gorsuch’s concurrence got this argument right: The commission departed
from neutrality via a religious gerrymander.131 The commission
differentiated between knowing and intentional discrimination in Jack’s
case but applied a presumption of discrimination in Phillips’s case.132 The
commission determined that the bakeries in Jack’s case acted properly in
denying his requests while Phillips acted impermissibly.133 This disparate
treatment—evidenced by the commission’s different set of rules for each
case—coupled with the commission’s religious statements shows
nonneutral enforcement of the anti-discrimination law.
The dissent also noted that the majority’s opinion is “far removed”
from the Court’s opinion in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye.134 The dissent
argued that in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, one single decision-making
body—the Hialeah City Council—acted and violated a religious group’s
rights.135 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Phillips’s case was heard by and
adjudicated in numerous decision-making bodies.136 The dissent argued
that prejudice was clearly found in the single decision-making body in
the former case and that prejudice could not be found in the numerous
decision-making bodies in the latter case.137
However, the dissent’s interpretation of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye
is far removed from that case’s holding. In that case, the Court held that
“subtle departures from neutrality” violate the First Amendment since the
Constitution “commits the government itself to religious tolerance, and
130. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1725–26.
131. Id. at 1739 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 1735–36.
133. Id. at 1736.
134. Id. at 1751 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1751–52 (“What prejudice infected the determinations of the adjudicators in the
case before and after the Commission? The Court does not say. Phillips’[s] case is thus far
removed from the only precedent upon which the Court relies, where the government action
that violated a principle of religious neutrality implicated a sole decisionmaking body, the city
council.” (citation omitted)).
136. Id. at 1751.
137. Id. at 1751–52.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 6

1362

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from
animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause
to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it
secures.”138 The Hialeah City Council’s actions and statements evidenced
a lack of neutrality. In this case, the commission, via its comments about
religion and its treatment of Jack’s and Phillips’s cases, evidenced
intolerance for Phillips’s religious beliefs, thus violating Phillips’s
constitutional rights.
True, the governmental entity in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye was a
city council, and the governmental entity in Masterpiece Cakeshop was
an adjudicatory state administrative agency. But the nonneutrality and
biased decision-making of an adjudicatory governmental entity should
cause more concern than a legislative entity. After all, in adjudications,
liberty interests are often at stake,139 and due process is premised on
impartial decision-making.140
Taken in total, the majority and Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence
persuasively analyzed the free exercise arguments in the case and adhered
to the Court’s precedent. The same, however, cannot be said of the
dissent.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop was an
unexpected one. The case was widely billed as a free speech case but was
resolved on free exercise grounds. Many thought that the case would
come down on ideological lines, but a 7–2 majority ruled the day. Despite
the seven-person majority, each Justice would have resolved the case
slightly differently. Still, the Masterpiece Cakeshop case does provide
some answers. The Court’s decision affirmed the Court’s Smith free
exercise framework, provided another example of nonneutral
governmental action, and reinforced an important tenet of the Free
Exercise Clause—the government must respect and tolerate religion.
138. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 547 (1993)
(quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).
139. See generally Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (“[T]he
court has required due process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal
constraints imposed by the criminal process.”).
140. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975) (“[A] ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process.’ . . . Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally
unacceptable but ‘our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of
unfairness.’ In pursuit of this end, various situations have been identified in which experience
teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to
be constitutionally tolerable.” (citation omitted) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955))). But see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 557–59 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(questioning the extent to which comments made during the legislative decision-making process
should be considered in this analysis).
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